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Leveling Up After DOMA 
DEBORAH A. WIDISS∗ 
So let’s say three soldiers are injured and they are all in same-sex 
relationships, and in each instance the other partner in this relationship 
wants to visit the soldier in—in a hospital. 
 The first is a spouse in a State that allows same-sex marriage, the 
second is a domestic partner in a State that an [sic] allows that, but not 
same-sex marriage, the third is in an equally committed loving 
relationship in a State that doesn’t involve either. Now, your argument 
is that, under Federal law, the first would be admitted—should be 
admitted, but the other two would be kept out? 
—Justice Samuel Alito to Solicitor General Donald Verrilli, Jr., Transcript of 
Oral Argument in Windsor v. United States1 
INTRODUCTION 
Windsor v. United States2 ended one form of federal marriage discrimination—
the refusal to recognize any same-sex marriages—and simultaneously created a 
new form of federal marriage discrimination. Under the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA), same-sex couples were simply categorically denied federal rights.3 Now 
that this section of DOMA has been held unconstitutional, same-sex couples are 
sorted into three tiers, with married same-sex couples who live in states that 
recognize their marriages receiving the full panoply of federal marriage rights; 
married same-sex couples who live in states that refuse to recognize their marriages 
receiving some, but not all, federal rights; and unmarried same-sex couples 
receiving none of the federal rights.4 This new discrimination is different from 
DOMA and from the bans on same-sex marriage that remain in place in more than 
thirty states. These older bans distinguish (I believe unfairly and 
unconstitutionally)5 between same-sex and different-sex couples, but they treat 
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 1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 85, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) 
(No. 12-307). 
 2. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 3. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). 
 4. See infra text accompanying notes 45, 47, and 49. 
 5. See Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 
U. PA. L. REV. 1375 (2010) (discussing arguments under the fundamental rights branch of 
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same-sex couples consistently.6 By contrast, under the new regime, the federal 
government—a single sovereign entity—is now treating committed same-sex 
couples who live in states in which they cannot marry quite differently from their 
married counterparts. Because of this “derivative” discrimination, a product of the 
interaction of federal policy with state marriage bans, the majority of gay and 
lesbian couples remain ineligible for full federal marriage rights.7 Windsor was an 
important step forward, but we need to finish the process of “leveling up.” 
In the initial aftermath of the Windsor decision there has been significant 
discussion of one aspect of this “new” marriage discrimination: the question of 
whether various federal statutory regimes will adopt a place-of-celebration rule—
recognizing any marriage that is valid in the jurisdiction where the ceremony 
occurred—or a domicile rule—recognizing only those marriages that are valid in 
the jurisdiction where the couple resides.8 This has largely been analyzed as a 
matter of statutory and regulatory analysis, looking statute by statute at whether, 
and how, “marriage” is defined, or applying general choice-of-law and conflicts 
rules.9 Leading advocacy groups, major newspapers, and even President Obama 
have urged adoption of a uniform place-of-celebration rule,10 and many federal 
agencies have announced that they will recognize all legal marriages, even if the 
couple lives in a state that does not.11 
I applaud this recognition that committed same-sex couples who live in states 
with marriage bans should have access to the federal rights that are premised on 
marriage. But there are some serious problems with relying solely on a place-of-
celebration approach to address the current inequity. It requires that these couples 
travel out-of-state (and often significant distances) to marry simply to claim federal 
benefits, imposing an unfair burden on same-sex couples and one which will likely 
further exacerbate class-based variation in marriage rates. It also all but guarantees 
that many same-sex couples will be unable to celebrate their marriage in the 
                                                                                                                 
equal protection law); Deborah A. Widiss, Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt & Douglas NeJaime, 
Exposing Sex Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence¸ 30 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 461 (2007) (discussing sex discrimination arguments). 
 6. This is a slight oversimplification. There have been a few states that have 
recognized out-of-state same-sex marriages even when refusing to license same-sex 
marriages themselves, but generally only for a relatively short period of time before 
expanding marriage rights within their own states. See, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689 
(discussing New York’s evolution on the issue). In October 2013, Oregon began recognizing 
out-of-state marriages, but Oregon does not (yet) permit same-sex couples to marry within 
the state. See Richard Gonzales, How a County Clerk Ignited the Gay Marriage Debate in 
N.M., NPR (Oct. 22, 2013). 
 7. See infra note 44. 
 8. See infra Part II.A. 
 9. See infra text accompanying notes 47–49 (discussing guidance provided by relevant 
agencies regarding specific federal policies); see also William Baude, Beyond DOMA: 
Choice of State Law in Federal Statutes, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (2012) (discussing how 
general choice-of-law principles should apply in this context); Hillel Y. Levin, Resolving 
Interstate Conflicts Over Same-Sex Non-Marriage, 63 FLA. L. REV. 47 (2011) (discussing 
how conflicts principles should apply to interstate recognition of civil unions or domestic 
partnerships, as well as marriage). 
 10. See infra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra text accompanying notes 47–49. 
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company of their friends and family. And some couples who do go out-of-state to 
marry may later discover a separate—hidden, but very significant—cost: an 
inability to divorce if the marriage does not unfold as they hope. The reason? 
Generally, a couple can divorce only in their home state, and many states refuse to 
recognize same-sex marriages even to dissolve them. 
For couples who live in states in which they cannot marry, these costs might be 
preferable to the alternative of being denied federal rights entirely under a domicile 
rule. But this is a false choice, because it simply accepts, as a given, that state-
licensed marriages will, and implicitly should, continue to be the exclusive 
mechanism for accessing core federal rights. In this Essay, I challenge that 
underlying assumption. (In a separate working paper, I discuss the related question 
of whether, consistent with equal protection principles, the federal government may 
continue to use marriage as the sole dividing line.)12 As suggested by Justice 
Alito’s question opening this Essay, it is rather odd, to say the least, that same-sex 
couples’ rights and obligations under key federal statutory provisions now depend 
on the state in which they happen to live.13 Rather than accept the serious problems 
implicit in a place-of-celebration rule, I argue that the federal government should 
develop its own mechanism—a federal domestic partner or “marriage” registry—
for identifying committed couples.14 Although this would involve some logistical 
challenges, the success of state and local registries suggest that this could provide a 
workable, and fundamentally fairer, vehicle for providing access to federal benefits, 
rights, and obligations. 
Of course, it is widely expected that sooner or later (and many think sooner), the 
Supreme Court will hold that state bans on same-sex marriage are unconstitutional. 
If same-sex couples were permitted to marry in all states, the problem of derivative 
federal discrimination would disappear entirely. I would celebrate a decision that 
led to marriage equality in all states, but it also might signal a lost opportunity. 
DOMA and the Windsor litigation highlighted the extraordinary variety of 
federal rights, benefits, and obligations that are currently premised on marriage. 
The current uneven treatment of same-sex couples continues that conversation. If 
same-sex couples are truly treated identically to different-sex couples under federal 
and state law, pressure for rethinking federal marriage law more generally may 
decrease. This would be unfortunate. While not my primary focus in this Essay, I 
agree with other commentators that it would be preferable to replace the use of 
marriage as an all-or-nothing gateway to benefits (for both different-sex and same-
sex couples) with more tailored policies that can better achieve specific underlying 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. Deborah A. Widiss, Federal Marriage Discrimination, Take Two (working draft) (on 
file with author). 
 13. The factual predicate for Justice Alito’s question is actually incorrect, see infra text 
accompanying note 104, but his more general point that federal rights for these three couples 
would vary significantly is undeniably true. There are other areas of law where federal rights 
turn on variation in state law. See, e.g., Astrue v. Caputo, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2032 & fn.9 
(2012) (discussing variation in state law regarding intestacy rights for posthumously 
conceived children, which in turn affects eligibility for Social Security survivor benefits). 
However, marriage is probably unique in the number of distinct federal right and obligations 
affected and in the number of individuals affected. 
 14. See infra Part II.C. 
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objectives.15 Thus, my hope is that efforts to “level up” marriage policy to treat 
committed same-sex couples equally regardless of their state of residence will not 
undermine efforts to also “broaden out” and “focus in” marriage policy. Indeed, a 
federal domestic partner registry could serve as a vehicle for such future tailoring. 
Part I of this Essay suggests that although federal law generally uses marriage as 
an imperfect but workable proxy for identifying committed couples with integrated 
finances, variation in state marriage rights means that reliance on marriage does not 
effectively serve this purpose for same-sex couples. Part II explores the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of two different approaches to “leveling up”—adopting 
place-of-celebration rules and creating a federal domestic partner or “marriage” 
registry—and advocates the latter approach. Part III briefly discusses how this 
“new” federal discrimination fits into broader discussions of changing family forms 
and the need to reconsider federal marriage policy in general. 
I. FEDERAL “MARRIAGE” LAW 
As is now familiar, the General Accounting Office has identified more than 
1000 provisions of the federal code that use marriage as a factor in determining 
rights, benefits, and obligations, spanning the gamut from intellectual property to 
immigration.16 A comprehensive review of federal marriage law is beyond the 
scope of this Essay, but, generally, federal laws use marriage, or sometimes 
marriage plus other factors, to identify “real” relationships that Congress has 
determined should be protected, encouraged, or otherwise recognized, sometimes 
as a means of supporting children born to such marriages.17 For a wide range of 
benefits—such as family medical leave rights, federal civilian and military 
employee benefits, and immigration purposes—federal law limits availability to 
married couples as a way both to foster marital relationships and to protect the 
government and private employers from being “duped” into providing these kinds 
of privileges in the absence of (what the government recognizes as) a bona fide 
significant relationship. In other contexts, ranging from joint tax returns, to 
government ethics rules, to eligibility for means-tested poverty supports and 
student loans, federal laws use marriage as a means of identifying individuals who 
are likely to have integrated finances, such that the failure to identify individuals as 
part of a collective unit could either invite abuse or fail to appropriately recognize 
presumptively available resources.18 Indeed, as I have discussed elsewhere, the 
structure of many aspects of federal (and state) marriage law not only responds to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT: 
UPDATE TO PRIOR REPORT (2004). 
 17. See generally Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2012) 
(providing a detailed analysis of marriage fraud doctrines in various areas of law). 
 18. See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013) (discussing 
government ethics rules and student financial aid); Abrams, supra note 17, at 18–19, 28–29 
(discussing means-tested programs); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: 
Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63 (1993) 
(discussing tax). 
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integrated finances but also encourages couples to specialize into distinct 
caregiving and breadwinning roles.19 
For many couples there are important financial benefits to being recognized as 
married under the federal code. These include exemptions from paying tax on the 
imputed value of health insurance received through a spouse’s employment,20 
eligibility for Social Security spousal benefits,21 and, as highlighted in Windsor, the 
ability to inherit from a spouse without paying estate tax.22 Although Edie 
Windsor’s $363,000 tax bill23 was rather unusual, large sums may be at stake for 
typical middle class couples as well. For example, because of Social Security 
spousal benefits, which permit a dependent spouse to receive benefits based on 
contributions made by a breadwinning spouse, a married couple with a sole 
breadwinner making $44,600 (the national average wage) will likely receive at least 
$500,000 more in Social Security and Medicare benefits than an unmarried 
individual earning that same $44,600, even though the married couple pays exactly 
the same amount as the unmarried individual in total payroll taxes.24 Couples who 
earn significantly different amounts also pay less in taxes if they are married than 
they would pay collectively if they were single (this is usually called the “marriage 
bonus”).25 And federal civilian or military employees receive generous spousal 
benefits.26 Federal rights premised on marriage may be immeasurably important to 
individuals for reasons other than their pocketbooks. If one’s partner is a foreign 
                                                                                                                 
 
 19. Deborah A. Widiss, Changing the Marriage Equation, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 721, 
747–57 (2012). 
 20. See, e.g., M.V. LEE BADGETT, WILLIAMS INST., UNEQUAL TAXES ON EQUAL 
BENEFITS: THE TAXATION OF DOMESTIC PARTNER BENEFITS (2007) (estimating that an 
employee with a domestic partner receiving health insurance pays on average $1069 per year 
more in taxes than a comparable married employee with a spouse receiving the same 
benefits). 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b), (c) (2006); see also Peter W. Martin, The Case for Reforming 
the Program’s Spouse Benefits While “Saving Social Security” (Cornell Law Sch., Working 
Paper No. 12-67), available at http://library2.lawschool.cornell.edu/facbib/faculty.asp?facid
=21&show=online (providing detailed history of spousal benefits). 
 22. 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (2006); Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683 (discussing this provision). 
 23. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.  
 24. See C. EUGENE STEUERLE & CALEB QUAKENBUSH, URBAN INST., SOCIAL SECURITY 
AND MEDICARE TAXES AND BENEFITS OVER A LIFETIME (2012), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412660-Social-Security-and-Medicare-Taxes-and
-Benefits-Over-a-Lifetime.pdf. For more on Social Security spousal benefits, see infra text 
accompanying notes 98–102. 
 25. See, e.g., Stephanie Hunter McMahon, To Have and to Hold: What Does Love (of 
Money) Have to Do with Joint Tax Filing?, 11 NEV. L.J. 718, 719–20 (2011). 
 26. See, e.g., KATELIN P. ISAACS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21029, SURVIVOR 
BENEFITS FOR FAMILIES OF CIVILIAN FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND RETIREES (2012) 
(summarizing civilian spouse survivor benefits); Matthew Alex Ward, The Military Must 
Lead in Advocating for Marriage Equality, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 457 (2013) 
(summarizing military spousal benefits); Healthcare Eligibility, OFF. PERSONNEL MGMT., 
http://www.opm.gov/healthcare-insurance/healthcare/eligibility/ (federal employees’ spouses 
are eligible for health insurance). 
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national, marriage provides a pathway to citizenship.27 If one’s partner is seriously 
ill, marriage provides, for many employees, a right to hold onto a job while taking 
time off to provide care.28 
But not all couples benefit by being considered married for federal purposes. 
Beyond the lowest tax brackets, married couples who earn relatively equal incomes 
pay more in taxes than they would if they were single.29 Within days of the decision 
in Windsor, there were numerous articles in the popular press cautioning same-sex 
couples to be wary of this “marriage penalty,”30 an issue made particularly relevant 
by the fact that same-sex couples have historically been more likely than different-
sex couples to earn relatively similar amounts.31 Marriage (to a wage-earner) may 
also raise an individual above eligibility levels for means-tested programs such as 
the Earned Income Tax Credit or Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.32 And 
remarriage by a widow or a divorcee generally cuts off eligibility for Social 
Security spousal benefits.33 
My deeper point is not that a given couple will always want to be considered 
married for federal purposes, but rather that federal law makes judgments about 
how to fairly distribute and apportion government resources, benefits, and 
obligations among various family structures, and it uses marriage as a proxy for 
identifying couples who have made a long-term commitment to each other, who 
may well be raising children together, and who have integrated their finances.34 
Same-sex (and different-sex) couples in all states form these kinds of relationships, 
and the federal government should strive to treat such couples, whatever their state 
of residence, relatively equally. 
There is at least one prominent past example of reform efforts spurred by 
variation in state family law that resulted in similar couples being treated 
significantly differently under federal law. Until the 1940s, married couples filed 
                                                                                                                 
 
 27. See, e.g., Policy Manual, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES 202 (June 10, 
2013), http://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/PDF/PolicyManual.pdf. 
 28. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (2006). 
 29. See, e.g., McMahon, supra note 25, at 719–20. 
 30. See, e.g., Blake Ellis, Same-Sex Couples: Beware the Marriage Penalty, 
CNNMONEY (June 27, 2013, 7:07 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/06/27/pf/same-sex
-marriage-penalty/index.html; Susanna Kim & Lauren Pearle, Many Same-Sex Couples May 
Pay More in Taxes After Marriage, ABC NEWS (June 27, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com
/Business/sex-couples-pay-taxes-marriage/story?id=19505554&singlePage=true; Roberton 
Williams, DOMA’s Demise Means Higher Taxes for Some Same-Sex Couples, FORBES (June 
26, 2013, 2:27 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2013/06/26/domas
-demise-means-higher-tax-bills-for-some-same-sex-couples/. 
 31. See, e.g., Dan A. Black, Seth G. Sanders & Lowell J. Taylor, The Economics of 
Lesbian and Gay Families, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 53, 63 (2007). 
 32. See, e.g., Gregory Acs & Elaine Maag, Irreconcilable Differences? The Conflict 
Between Marriage Promotion Initiatives for Cohabiting Couples with Children and 
Marriage Penalties in Tax and Transfer Programs, in NEW FEDERALISM, at 2 (Urban Inst., 
Ser. No. B-66, 2005). 
 33. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 21, at 14. 
 34. As I discuss in a working paper, as applied to different-sex couples, marriage is an 
imperfect proxy but probably not so under- or over-inclusive as to be unconstitutional. As 
applied to same-sex couples, it may be. Widiss, supra note 12. 
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taxes as individuals (or a joint return taxed at individual rates, which was usually 
disadvantageous). This meant that couples living in community property states, 
who were required to share both earned and investment income and thus fell within 
lower tax brackets, generally paid far less federal income tax than comparable 
couples in common law title states, who were not permitted to share or transfer 
earned income. This result was considered profoundly unfair, and the joint return 
for married couples, with a separate rate structure from individual returns, was put 
in place to address this inequity.35 
The potential injustice of federal rights for same-sex couples varying 
dramatically based on the state in which they live was a persistent theme in the oral 
argument in Windsor. It was pursued by Justices Alito and Scalia in their 
questioning of Solicitor General Donald Verrilli, Jr. and Edie Windsor’s attorney 
Roberta Kaplan and emphasized by BLAG attorney Paul Clement in his arguments 
in support of DOMA.36 In the Windsor opinion, however, the issue receded almost 
into invisibility.37 The reasons for that change are not hard to surmise. In a world 
with DOMA, the expectation that the federal government would treat same-sex 
couples consistently was an argument for upholding the law. Paul Clement, and 
Justices Scalia and Alito—both of whom ultimately dissented in Windsor—might 
have believed that the argument could garner some sympathy from other justices 
more inclined to strike DOMA down. In the post-DOMA world, however, the 
argument immediately flips. Now, state-based variation in marriage rights calls for 
a more general rethinking of the federal government’s reliance on state marriage 
definitions as the sole mechanism for qualifying for important federal benefits and 
obligations. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 35. See, e.g., Lily Kahng, One Is the Loneliest Number: The Single Taxpayer in a Joint 
Return World, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 651, 653–55 (2010) (discussing this history); Julie A.D. 
Manasfi, Joint Federal Income Tax Returns: If DOMA Dies and Even if It Lives the Weak 
Case for Distinguishing Between Same-Sex and Different-Sex Married Couples 14–19 (Mar. 
14, 2013) (unpublished paper), available at http://works.bepress.com/julie_manasfi/2/ 
(discussing this history and quoting a Senate Report stating that the joint return was intended 
to “produce substantial geographical equalization”). 
 36. In addition to the quotation from Justice Alito, supra text accompanying note 1, see, 
e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 87 (question of Justice Scalia to Solicitor 
General Verrilli) (“So you think that’s bad as well, that all three of those [couples] have to be 
treated the same, despite State law about marriage[?]”); id. at 100–02 (Justice Alito posing 
questions to Roberta Kaplan regarding a potential equal protection claim brought by a same-
sex couple living in North Carolina denied a waiver of the estate tax); id. at 111–12 (BLAG 
attorney Paul Clement) (“And we heard today that there’s a problem when somebody moves 
from New York to North Carolina, they can lose their benefits. The Federal government . . . 
can say, well, that doesn’t make any sense . . . . We don’t want somebody, if they are going 
to be transferred in the military from West Point to Fort Sill in Oklahoma, to resist the 
transfer because they are going to lose some benefits. It makes sense to have a uniform 
Federal rule for the Federal government.”) (emphasis added). 
 37. The majority opinion does not touch on the issue at all. Justice Scalia’s dissent 
highlights some of the choice-of-law questions that will arise if a couple moves from a 
marriage-recognition state to a non-recognition state. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2708 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
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Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Windsor, however, fails to take up that 
invitation, stating explicitly that “[t]his opinion and its holding are confined to” 
only “those persons who are joined in same-sex marriages made lawful by the 
State.”38 As a matter of legal doctrine, this limitation is reasonable, since that was 
the question actually at issue in the case. And of course, the statement is a 
calculated response to the charge, argued vociferously by Justice Scalia in dissent, 
that Windsor effectively decided the larger question of whether state bans on same-
sex marriage were similarly unconstitutional.39 But in thus circumscribing the 
holding, Windsor leaves unaddressed a deeper inequality. That is, Windsor speaks 
stirringly of the significant tangible and intangible harms DOMA caused to same-
sex married couples who were unfairly denied federal rights ranging from “the 
mundane to the profound.”40 The opinion fails to even acknowledge, however, that 
so long as the federal government continues to simply rely on state marriage 
classifications, existing bans on marriage in more than thirty states have similar 
pernicious effects. 
Of course, even if state bans were eliminated, not every same-sex couple would 
marry. But when states do legalize marriage, an average of 30% of identified same-
sex couples marry within the first year alone.41 This suggests that a significant 
number of same-sex couples living in non-recognition states would marry if they 
could—and, more centrally, that a significant number of such couples make 
personal and financial commitments to each other that are functionally 
indistinguishable from those made by (different-sex and same-sex) married 
couples. 
II. LEVELING UP 
Census data suggests that there are approximately 646,000 same-sex couples 
living together in the United States.42 At the time Windsor was litigated, 
approximately 114,000 of these same-sex couples were married, with about 76,000 
living in a state that recognized their marriage and another 38,000 living in a state 
that did not.43 In other words, when DOMA was held unconstitutional, only a small 
                                                                                                                 
 
 38. Id. at 2695, 2696 (majority decision). 
 39. Id. at 2709–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 40. Id. at 2694 (majority opinion). 
 41. M.V. LEE BADGETT & JODY L. HERMAN, WILLIAMS INST., PATTERNS OF 
RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION BY SAME-SEX COUPLES IN THE UNITED STATES 11–12 (2011). 
 42. Brief of Gary J. Gates as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent Windsor at 15–16, 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675. 
 43. See id. at 25–26 (estimating that there were 114,000 same-sex couples in the United 
States who were married); Press Release, Williams Inst., Supreme Court Rulings Strike 
Down DOMA and Prevent Enforcement of California’s Proposition 8 (June 26, 2013), 
available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/press/press-releases/supreme-court-rulings
-26-jun-2013/ (estimating 76,000 married couples live in states that recognize the union and 
38,000 live in states that do not); see also Drew DeSilver, How Many Same-Sex Marriages 
in the U.S.? At Least 71,165, Probably More, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June 26, 2013), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/26/how-many-same-sex-marriages-in-the-
u-s-at-least-71165-probably-more (documenting at least 71,165 same-sex marriages by 
reviewing state marriage records, but noting the actual number was almost certainly far 
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fraction—approximately one-eighth—of identified same-sex couples actually 
received full federal marriage rights. That number has since grown considerably: 
California, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Rhode Island 
have all legalized marriage by same-sex couples since Windsor was decided. But 
even with these recent additions, more than half of the nation’s same-sex couples 
live in non-recognition states.44 Federal policy should be changed so that couples, 
whatever their state of residence, who are willing to make formal commitments to 
each other comparable to those made by married couples can access the rights, 
benefits, and obligations of marriage under federal law. 
A. Three Tiers of Federal Marriage Rights 
Now that section three of DOMA has been struck down, federal marriage policy 
sorts same-sex couples into three tiers. Couples who are lawfully married and live 
in states that recognize their marriages receive all of the federal benefits and 
obligations of marriage. Couples who are lawfully married but live in states that do 
not recognize their marriage receive some of the federal benefits and obligations of 
marriage. Same-sex couples who are unmarried—including, most likely, those in 
state-created civil unions or domestic partnerships—receive none of the federal 
benefits and obligations of marriage.45 
The key question for married couples living in non-recognition states is whether 
the relevant statute, regulation, or agency policy indicates that marriages will be 
                                                                                                                 
higher since many states had not yet reported data from 2012 or 2013). 
 44. In October 2013, immediately after New Jersey legalized same-sex marriage, the 
Williams Institute at UCLA estimated that 40% of the nation’s estimated 646,000 same-sex 
couples were living in a state where they could marry. Press Release, Williams Inst., Almost 
17,000 Same-Sex Couples Now Eligible for Marriage Benefits in New Jersey (Oct. 21, 
2013), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/press/press-releases/almost-17000
-same-sex-couples-now-eligible-for-marriage-benefits-in-new-jersey/. The 40% number 
pre-dated the addition of Hawaii and Illinois, but Illinois has been estimated to have 
approximately 23,000 same-sex couples, Infographic: Illinois, WILLIAMS INSTITUTE (Nov. 
2013), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/headlines/infographic-extending-marriage-to
-same-sex-couples-in-il/, and Hawaii certainly has far fewer same-sex couples, Infographic: 
Hawai’i, Williams Institute (Nov. 2013), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/research
/census-lgbt-demographics-studies/infographic-hi-snapshot/, meaning that still fewer than 
44% of same-sex couples live in a state with marriage equality. Additionally, Oregon 
recently began recognizing out-of-state same-sex marriages, see supra note 6, but even with 
this addition, well over 50% of same-sex couples live in non-recognition states, and thus are 
categorically barred from some key federal rights premised on marriage. 
 45. Several federal agencies have indicated that individuals in civil unions or domestic 
partnerships will not be considered “married” for federal purposes. Garden State Equal. v. 
Dow, No. L-1729-11, 2013 WL 5397372, at *7–8 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.) (Sept. 27, 
2013) (collecting agency statements on the matter). This is not surprising, since the relevant 
federal statutes typically use words such as “marriage,” “spouse,” “wife,” or “husband.” 
Citing this trend, a New Jersey lower court decision held that refusing to permit same-sex 
couples to marry (rather than just form civil unions) violated the state constitution because it 
deprived couples of significant federal rights. Id. at *24. In October 2013, Governor Chris 
Christie decided not to appeal this ruling, and same-sex marriage became available statewide 
in New Jersey. Kate Zernike and Marc Santora, As Gays Wed in New Jersey, Christie Yields, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2013, at A1. 
52 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 89:43 
 
judged based on a place-of-celebration rule—that is, whether it was valid within the 
jurisdiction where the couple married—or a domicile rule—that is, whether it is 
valid within the jurisdiction where the couple resides. Until DOMA was held 
unconstitutional, variation among federal standards on this issue was relatively 
unimportant. States generally have fairly similar rules (other than those concerning 
same-sex marriage) regarding who may get married, and, where there are 
differences (again, other than those concerning same-sex marriage), most states will 
recognize an out-of-state marriage as valid even if they would not have authorized 
it directly.46 Therefore, for different-sex couples, application of a “place-of-
celebration” or a “domicile” rule will generally lead to the same result: a couple 
who has lawfully married in one state is considered married wherever they reside 
for both federal and state purposes. For same-sex couples, that is certainly not the 
case. 
Thus, the domicile or place-of-celebration question must be answered for each 
of the 1000-plus distinct federal statutory provisions that address marriage. 
Relevant agencies have announced that tax, immigration, military and civilian 
federal employee benefits, and private benefits governed by ERISA will follow a 
place-of-celebration rule.47 (Some of these legal interpretations, however, may be 
challenged.)48 Social Security, by contrast, will follow a domicile rule, and most 
likely so will veterans’ benefits and the federally-protected right of many 
nonfederal employees to take time off from work to care for a spouse with a serious 
                                                                                                                 
 
 46. See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the Problem of Non-
Uniform Marriage Laws, 84 OR. L. REV. 433, 435, 442–44 (2005). Most states recognize a 
“public policy” exception to this general rule but, at least since the Supreme Court held that 
anti-miscegenation laws were unconstitutional, it has been little invoked in any context other 
than same-sex marriage. See id.; see also Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage and 
Public Policy: The Miscegenation Precedents, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 105 (1996). 
 47. See OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION LETTER NO. 13-203, 
COVERAGE OF SAME-SEX SPOUSES (2013) (discussing federal employee benefits); Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., DOD Announces Same-Sex Spouse Benefits (Aug. 14, 2013), 
available at http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=16203 (discussing 
military benefits); Press Release, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, All Legal Same-Sex 
Marriages Will Be Recognized for Federal Tax Purposes, (Aug. 29, 2013), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2153.aspx (discussing tax); U.S. 
Dep’t of Labor, Technical Release No. 2013-04, Guidance to Employee Benefit Plans on the 
Definition of “Spouse” and “marriage” under ERISA and the Supreme Court’s Decision in 
United States v. Windsor (Sept. 18, 2013) (discussing ERISA); Implementation of the 
Supreme Court Ruling on the Defense of Marriage Act, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
http://www.dhs.gov/topic/implementation-supreme-court-ruling-defense-marriage-act 
(discussing immigration rights). 
 48. See, e.g., Alberto R. Gonzales & David N. Strange, Op-Ed., What the Court Didn’t 
Say, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2013, at A23 (arguing that same-sex married couples are still not 
eligible for spousal rights under immigration law); see also Richard A. Oppel, Jr., 3 States 
End Resistance to Spousal Benefits Order, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2013, at A24 (reporting that 
nine states initially refused to process benefits paperwork for same-sex of National Guard 
members on the grounds that doing so would violate state law, but that as of late-November 
2013 only three states continued their opposition to the new rule). 
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medical condition.49 For many other policies, it is still unclear which approach will 
be adopted. Federal agencies are presumably working to provide additional 
guidance as soon as possible. Nonetheless, without a comprehensive statutory fix, 
there will be confusion and uncertainty for individuals, regulators, and courts for 
months and years to come—and some significant federal benefits will remain 
categorically unavailable to same-sex couples who live in states that refuse to 
recognize same-sex marriages. 
B. A Place-of-Celebration Rule—And Its Significant Weaknesses 
The most frequently discussed solution to the “new” marriage discrimination—
that is, the uneven treatment of same-sex couples based on their state of 
residence—is that the federal government should pass legislation adopting a 
uniform place-of-celebration rule that would apply to all federal rights and 
obligations of marriage. This approach has been proposed in Congress50 and 
endorsed by leading advocacy groups,51 prominent news organizations,52 and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 49. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.113 (2013) (“Spouse [for purposes of the Family and Medical 
Leave Act] means a husband or wife as defined or recognized under State law for purposes 
of marriage in the State where the employee resides.”); Program Operations Manual 
System—GN 00210 BASIC: Windsor Same-Sex Marriage Claims, SSA.GOV (Aug. 9, 2013), 
https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/public/reference.nsf/links/08092013111040AM (providing that 
spousal claims will be permitted when claimant “was married in a state that permits same-
sex marriage” and “is domiciled at the time of the application, or while the claim is pending 
a final determination, in a state that recognizes same-sex marriage”); Press Release, Dep’t of 
Justice, Attorney General Holder Announces Move to Extend Veterans Benefits to Same-
Sex Married Couples (Sept. 4, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa
/pr/2013/September/13-ag-991.html. Further analysis may be found in a detailed set of fact 
sheets developed by a group of advocacy organizations, discussing the likely applicability of 
various federal statutes to couples who are married but live in states that do not recognize the 
marriage and providing updates as agencies have provided more definitive guidance. These 
are available on the coalition’s members’ websites. See After DOMA: What It Means for You 
[hereinafter After DOMA Fact Sheets], HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (July 9, 2013), 
http://www.hrc.org/blog/entry/what-do-the-doma-decisions-mean-for-you/ (fact sheet for 
“Veteran’s Spousal Benefits”) (discussing likelihood that place of domicile rule will apply). 
 50. Respect for Marriage Act, H.R. 2523, 113th Cong. (2013) (as of July 25, 2013, 165 
cosponsors); S. 1236, 113th Cong. (2013) (as of July 26, 2013, 42 cosponsors). As 
introduced, this bill would both establish a uniform place-of-celebration rule and repeal 
Section 2 of DOMA, which provides that states need not recognize other states’ same-sex 
marriages. See id. If the bill passed with both provisions intact, and if states did in fact begin 
to recognize out-of-state marriages, my concerns below regarding divorce would be 
mitigated. But both of those “ifs” are far from certain, since many state constitutions 
preclude such recognition and any change to that policy would probably be far more 
controversial than adopting a place-of-celebration rule for federal purposes. Moreover, even 
if other states did recognize the marriages, the up-front burdens, in terms of travel costs and 
dignitary injury, would remain a problem with a place-of-celebration rule. 
 51. The coalition of the leading LGBT advocacy groups characterizes “the movement’s 
next steps on DOMA” as a “commit[ment] to working until every single legally married 
same-sex couple receives the same protections, responsibilities, and programs as all other 
married couples—regardless of where they live—and to securing the freedom to marry 
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President Obama.53 Even without statutory reform, advocates and the 
administration have aggressively pushed individual agencies to adopt a place-of-
celebration approach in any context in which it is viable under existing statutory 
language. This has been successful, and many key federal marriage rights are now 
available to same-sex married couples even if they live in states with marriage 
bans.54 
I applaud this development. It obviously mitigates the substantive unfairness 
discussed above by making it at least theoretically possible for same-sex couples to 
receive the federal rights and benefits of marriage wherever they live. The place-of-
celebration approach has some other clear strengths. It is easy to apply and retains 
the familiar assumption that marriage is a gateway to benefits. It also allows the 
federal government to continue to piggyback on state procedures for licensing, 
recording, and dissolving marriages (though with some significant problems when 
it comes to divorce, as discussed below). And, for many areas of federal law, it 
does not require congressional action. 
But the place-of-celebration approach has some very significant weaknesses that 
have been little discussed. 
First, for some same-sex couples, requiring travel to a state where they can 
marry puts federal benefits literally out of reach. For example, a couple who lives 
in southern Florida would currently need to travel about 1000 miles to reach 
Maryland, the closest state with marriage equality. Although the military 
recognizes this problem and offers service members extra time off,55 most private 
employers will not do so. Nor will they pay the costs of such a trip. Already, 
marriage rates are highly skewed by educational achievement, class, and race.56 A 
place-of-celebration rule magnifies such disparities for same-sex couples. 
                                                                                                                 
nationwide.” After DOMA Fact Sheets, supra note 49 (fact sheet for “General” at 2). If the 
movement were actually successful in both these goals (that is, a uniform place-of-
celebration rule and securing the freedom to marry nationwide), the derivative 
discrimination problem would be eliminated. But again, at this point, the first goal is more 
politically viable than the second, and as discussed in the text, it has some significant 
weaknesses. 
 52. See, e.g., Editorial, Equal Marriages—and Now Equal Benefits, WASH. POST (July 
21, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-07-21/opinions/40713630_1_federal
-benefits-federal-government-nationalized-gay-marriage; Editorial, How Obama Can Make 
Same-Sex Marriage Meaningful, BLOOMBERG (June 27, 2013, 6:00 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-27/how-obama-can-make-same-sex-marriage
-meaningful.html (both endorsing a place-of-celebration rule). 
 53. See Colleen McCain Nelson, Obama Hails DOMA Ruling, Sees Work Ahead, WALL 
ST. J. WASH. WIRE (June 27, 2013, 8:33 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/06/27
/obama-hails-doma-ruling-sees-work-ahead/ (quoting President Obama as stating his 
“personal belief . . . that if you’ve been married in Massachusetts and you move somewhere 
else, you’re still married and that, under federal law, you should be able to obtain benefits 
like any lawfully married couple”). 
 54. See supra text accompanying note 47. 
 55. See U.S. Dep’t of Def., supra note 47. 
 56. See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW 
FAMILIES 22–23, 28–29 (2010), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11
/pew-social-trends-2010-families.pdf; Andrew J. Cherlin, Demographic Trends in the United 
States: A Review of Research in the 2000s, 72 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 403, 404–05 (2010). 
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Even for couples with the financial means to travel, there may be a significant 
dignitary harm. Windsor speaks in stirring tones of the importance of marriage as a 
means for couples to “affirm their commitment to one another before their children, 
their family, their friends, and their community.”57 Absent a holding that state 
marriage bans violate the Federal Constitution, the federal government cannot 
require states to allow same-sex couples to marry under state law in their own 
community. But same-sex couples in one part of the United States should not be 
forced to marry in a different part of the United States, which for many will 
necessarily be far from family and friends, simply to claim federal rights. 
And for some couples, the most serious problem with marrying out-of-state to 
obtain federal benefits will come later, if they ultimately decide they would like to 
dissolve their relationship. States will generally permit nonresident couples to 
marry, but they usually will not permit nonresident couples to divorce. Same-sex 
married couples who live in non-recognition states have already found (often to 
their shock and horror) that their home state will not grant them a divorce, and, in 
many instances, neither will the state that married them.58 In the best 
circumstances, this imposes considerable additional legal cost and complexity by 
requiring the couple to litigate a divorce in a jurisdiction where neither of them 
lives. In the worst cases, a couple is actually trapped in a marriage, for both state 
and federal purposes, that one or both would like to end but unable to obtain a 
divorce.59 
Divorce for same-sex couples living in non-recognition states was already a 
problem before Windsor. The demise of DOMA and the greater incentives that now 
exist for couples to go out-of-state to marry will make it worse. Adoption of a 
uniform place-of-celebration rule would raise the stakes even higher. So long as 
state marriage bans remain in place, federal policy should not require same-sex 
couples to run the risk of being literally “wedlocked”60 simply because they seek to 
access federal benefits. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 57. Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013). 
 58. This problem has been partially addressed for some couples: some states that permit 
same-sex marriage now permit same-sex couples who cannot divorce in their home state to 
seek a divorce in the state that married them. See NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, DIVORCE 
FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES WHO LIVE IN NON-RECOGNITION STATES: A GUIDE FOR ATTORNEYS 
(2013), available at http://www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/Divorce_in_DOMA
_States_Attorney_Guide.pdf. Other couples, however, continue to be trapped. See, e.g., 
Mary Patricia Byrn & Morgan L. Holcomb, Wedlocked, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (2012); 
Courtney G. Joslin, Modernizing Divorce Jurisdiction: Same-Sex Couples and Minimum 
Contacts, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1669 (2011) (both discussing these issues in detail). 
 59. For a discussion specifically of the federal tax consequences of the inability to 
divorce, see Anthony Infanti, Why Gay Couples Hate the IRS, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 9, 2013, 
9:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-06/why-gay-couples-hate-the-irs
-more-than-you-do.html. For a more general discussion of state and federal law 
consequences, see generally Byrn & Holcomb, supra note 58; Joslin, supra note 58. 
 60. I borrow this term from Mary Patricia Byrn and Morgan L. Holcomb. See Byrn & 
Holcomb, supra note 58. 
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C. A Federal Domestic Partner—or Marriage?—Registry 
It would be better for the federal government to develop its own mechanism for 
identifying committed couples who should be entitled to what are now considered 
federal marital benefits. This could be in addition to, or in place of, place-of-
celebration rules.61 That is, the federal government should respond to the problem 
of dramatically different state rules regarding who may marry by creating a registry 
that would permit (at least) same-sex couples to receive the federal rights and 
benefits of marriage regardless of their state of residence. 
Prior to DOMA being struck down, the military was developing a domestic 
partner registry that would have made many benefits that otherwise flow solely 
from marriage available to service members in same-sex relationships;62 the 
military has since (unfortunately I believe) abandoned this project and replaced it 
with a place-of-celebration rule.63 Likewise, also prior to Windsor, the Federal 
Office of Personnel Management advocated providing spousal benefits to same-sex 
partners of federal employees.64 The registry I suggest would go further than these 
proposals by providing, like state civil union and domestic partner analogues, the 
full panoply of federal marriage rights, or, as discussed in Part III, serving as a 
vehicle for better tailoring such rights for both same-sex and different-sex couples. 
Such a registry would address the core inequality left in DOMA’s wake without 
imposing front-end travel costs or back-end divorce challenges on same-sex 
couples. It would not, however, implicate rights and obligations—such as those 
concerning property distribution, spousal support, or custody—under state 
marriage law.65 
                                                                                                                 
 
 61. If the registry were developed in the absence of a uniform place-of-celebration rule, 
it should be structured in such a way as to include married couples living in non-recognition 
states, ideally through definitional provisions that would automatically include such 
marriages. 
 62. See Karen Parrish, Same-Sex Couples Can Claim New Benefits by October, U.S. 
DEP’T OF DEF. (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID
=119260. 
 63. See Memorandum from Chuck Hagel, Sec’y of Def., to Sec’ys of Military Dep’ts 
(Aug. 13, 2013) available at http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2013/docs/Extending
-Benefits-to-Same-Sex-Spouses-of-Military-Members.pdf (stating that “the extension of 
benefits to the same-sex domestic partners of military members is no longer necessary to 
remedy the inequity that was caused by section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act”); U.S. 
Dep’t of Def., supra note 47. 
 64. The OPM proposal included different-sex partners as well. See Eric Katz, OPM 
Proposes Extending Fed Health Benefits to Same Sex Partners, GOV’T EXECUTIVE (Apr. 11, 
2013), http://www.govexec.com/pay-benefits/2013/04/opm-proposes-extending-federal
-health-benefits-same-sex-partners/62439/. Bills have been introduced that would make the 
same policy change. See Domestic Partnership Benefits and Obligations Act, H.R. 3485, 
112th Cong. (2011); S. 1910, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 2517, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 1102, 
111th Cong. (2009) (would provide “marriage”-based employment benefits and obligations 
to federal employees in domestic partnerships); see also Social Security Equality Act, H.R. 
3050, 113th Cong. (2013) (would provide Social Security “spousal” benefits to same-sex 
couples in state-recognized legal statuses such as domestic partnerships or civil unions). 
 65. There are areas of federal law, including pension benefits and bankruptcy, where 
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State, local, and private employer domestic partner and civil union registries 
could provide a template for a federal registry.66 Most such registries require 
couples to affirm that the couple meets the jurisdiction’s requirements for marriage, 
other than being different-sex, and that they are in—and intend to remain in—a 
long-term committed relationship. Often, couples must affirm that they live 
together and/or have integrated financial responsibilities,67 standards that are not 
explicitly required for individuals who choose to marry68 but which articulate the 
assumptions regarding marriage that are embedded in federal law.69 Generally, they 
provide that partnerships may be ended simply upon notice to the relevant entity 
and the other person, although, as discussed below, more formal dissolution 
procedures might be required for a federal registry. 
If the federal government were to create a federal registry, it would face some 
different questions than those addressed by state, local, or private registries. A 
threshold question is whether such a registry would be constitutional. The short 
answer, I believe, is probably “yes.” In the Windsor litigation, some claimed that 
DOMA exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers, since states historically have had 
primary responsibility for licensing marriages.70 Windsor, while recognizing this 
history, explicitly declined to base its holding on these federalism arguments.71 And 
for good reason. Although the Supreme Court has sometimes characterized 
marriage as primarily a matter of state law, federal policy has long been integrally 
                                                                                                                 
federal marriage law intertwines with state marriage law and where careful thought would be 
required to determine how best to achieve the underlying objective of providing same-sex 
couples equal access to federal marital benefits without intruding unreasonably into what is 
properly considered state divorce law. See infra note 84 (discussing issues related to pension 
benefits in more detail). 
 66. The Human Rights Campaign maintains a list with links to dozens of different 
domestic partner registries. City and County Domestic Partner Registries, HUM. RTS. 
CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/city-and-county-domestic-partner-registries. 
 67. For example, the Dayton, OH registry requires partners to affirm that they “share a 
common residence” and “have a committed relationship and share responsibility for each 
other’s common welfare.” Domestic Partner Registry, CITY OF DAYTON, 
http://www.daytonohio.gov/cco/Pages/Registry.aspx. 
 68. See Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1772–73 (2005) 
(noting that marriage “in many respects licenses greater flexibility and less state intrusion 
into family life” than domestic partnership requirements and critiquing domestic partnerships 
on those grounds); see also Douglas NeJaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of 
Nonmarital Recognition and Its Relationship to Marriage, 102 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2014), draft available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2286320 
(showing how domestic partnerships were modeled on marriage, although ultimately they 
also helped redefine marriage). 
 69. To the extent that a registry that required such affirmations could provide a better 
proxy for achieving the objectives of certain federal policies, it theoretically could be used in 
place of “marriage” for both different-sex and same-sex couples. See infra Part III. 
 70. These arguments were advanced most fully in an amicus brief submitted to the 
Court by several prominent federalism scholars. See Brief of Federalism Scholars as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Respondent Windsor, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) 
(No. 12-307), 2013 WL 860459. 
 71. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (“[I]t is unnecessary to decide whether this federal 
intrusion on state power is a violation of the Constitution because it disrupts the federal 
balance.”). 
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involved in family matters.72 It seems clear that the federal government has power 
to define familial relationships for the purposes of developing and administering 
federal law.73 Notably, during oral argument in Windsor, the parties and several 
justices suggested that the federal government could extend the benefits to same-
sex couples through a registry along the lines I propose.74 
A second, I think harder, question is whether such a registry would be available 
only to same-sex couples and perhaps even only to same-sex couples who live in 
states in which they cannot marry. If the primary impetus behind the registry is 
simply to respond to the current inequities caused by the variation in state marriage 
rights for same-sex couples, it might be reasonable to limit its availability. On the 
other hand, there are some strong arguments for making such a status more 
generally available.75 In several other countries and in some U.S. states, domestic 
partnerships or civil unions are available as an alternative to marriage for both 
different-sex and same-sex couples; in France they have become almost as common 
as marriages (likely in part a reflection of the relative ease with which they may be 
dissolved compared to marriages).76 Colorado, Hawaii, and Vermont have created 
                                                                                                                 
 
 72. See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. 
REV. 1297 (1998). 
 73. See generally Courtney G. Joslin, Windsor, Federalism, and Family Equality, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 156 (2013) (discussing and critiquing federalism arguments in 
Windsor). 
 74. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 81 (question of Chief Justice 
Roberts to Solicitor General Verrilli) (Q: “[Y]ou agree that Congress could go the other way, 
right? Congress could pass a new law today that says . . . . [w]hen we say ‘marriage’ in 
Federal law, we mean same—committed same-sex couples as well, and that could apply 
across the board?” . . . A: “I don’t think it would raise a federalism problem.”); id. at 96–99 
(similar questions by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Alito to Roberta Kaplan, 
counsel for Edith Windsor, in which Kaplan likewise opined that Congress could do so at 
least if the status were called something other than marriage); cf. id. at 76 (answer by Paul 
Clement, BLAG attorney to a question by Justice Kennedy concerning arguments that 
DOMA violated federalism principles) (“I think there is so clearly is [sic] a Federal power 
because DOMA doesn’t define any term that appears anywhere other than in a Federal 
statute that we assume there is Federal power for.”). 
 75. See, e.g., NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE 146–207 
(2008) [hereinafter POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE] (arguing for 
reconsidering the use of marriage as a prerequisite for receipt of many government benefits, 
rights, and obligations); Elizabeth M. Glazer, Civil Union Equality, 2012 CARDOZO L. REV. 
DE NOVO 125, 133–36, http://www.cardozolawreview.com/Joomla1.5/content/denovo
/Glazer.DOMA.2012.Final.PDF (discussing personal or religious reasons why different-sex 
couples stated they preferred to form a domestic partnership under Illinois law than to 
marry); Nancy D. Polikoff, “Two Parts of the Landscape of Family in America”: 
Maintaining Both Spousal and Domestic Partner Employee Benefits for Both Same-Sex and 
Different-Sex Couples, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 735 (2012) (arguing that domestic partner 
benefits should be available for both different-sex and same-sex couples). 
 76. See William N. Eskridge Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of 
Menus, Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1881, 1943–44 (2012) 
(cataloging available statuses by state); Jessica R. Feinberg, Avoiding Marriage Tunnel 
Vision, 88 TULANE L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), draft available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2247552, at 50 (discussing ease of 
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“reciprocal” or “designated” beneficiary statuses that provide some “marital” rights 
to close family members, such as siblings or parents and children, who cannot 
marry, or, in Colorado’s case, to any pair of unmarried adults, whether or not they 
are related or in a romantic relationship.77 And, even more surprising to American 
sensibilities, in many other countries, cohabiting couples without any formal status 
receive many of the same rights as married couples.78 Creating a federal registry 
could invite more general reconsideration of the singular reliance on marriage 
under U.S. federal law. As discussed in Part III, particularly if a future Supreme 
Court decision grants same-sex couples the right to marry anywhere, a federal 
domestic partner registry could be a vehicle to better tailor federal policies for all 
families, so long as it was structured to treat comparable same-sex and different-sex 
couples equally. 
A related question would be what the registry should be called. As the fight over 
same-sex marriage has made clear, the word “marriage” carries immense symbolic 
weight. Some state supreme courts have held that it is so significant that calling 
same-sex unions anything else violates core principles of equality.79 If same-sex 
couples, wherever they live, could “marry” federally, they would gain access not 
only to the rights, benefits, and obligations of marriage under federal law but also 
to the respect for marital relationships that undergirds those federal policies. That 
said, calling the status marriage would undoubtedly be more controversial 
politically and it would seem to more squarely implicate federalism concerns. It 
also would signal strongly that federal policy remains focused exclusively on 
“marital” status. For both these reasons, I would suggest that, in this context, the 
word might not be worth the fight, although I recognize that there are compelling 
arguments on the other side. 
Additional technical issues would need to be resolved. Would there be a single 
federal standard for other aspects of marriage eligibility (e.g., minimum age rules 
or consanguinity) or would the federal registry simply follow the rules of the 
                                                                                                                 
ending a French civil union); Scott Sayare & Maia de la Baume, Bliss for Many French 
Couples Is Now Less Marital Than Civil, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2010, at A1 (reporting civil 
unions could soon outnumber marriages in France, and that they are also available in several 
other countries). 
 77. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-101, et seq. (West 2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-
4 (2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1301. For a detailed description of these state laws, and 
how they relate to legal statuses for same-sex and different-sex couples, see Feinberg, supra 
note 76, at 6–16. 
 78. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE, supra note 75, at 110–22. In 
the United States, most governmental benefits premised on marriage are not available to 
cohabiting couples who lack legal status, but courts may hold that one member of the couple 
owes support to the other under contract or equitable theories. See Eskridge, supra note 76, 
at 1929–35. 
 79. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 480 (Conn. 2008); 
Ops. of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 571 (Mass. 2004) (both concluding 
separate status was impermissible). But see, e.g., Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 221 (N.J. 
2006) (concluding separate status was permissible). A more recent New Jersey case held that 
now that the different state terminology deprives couples of federal rights, the state was 
required to permit same-sex couples to marry. Garden State Equal. v. Dow, No. L-1729-11, 
2013 WL 5397372, at *24 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Sept. 27, 2013). 
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couple’s domicile state?80 Or, as suggested above, would eligibility be extended 
beyond couples with a romantic affiliation? Would it create any kind of “parental” 
relationship with a partner’s children for purposes of federal law, even in the 
absence of a recognized parental relationship under state law?81 And how would 
dissolution be handled? This last question is somewhat less difficult than it might 
appear at first blush. The primary objective of much of state marriage and divorce 
law is the regulation of a couple’s obligations to each other, and property 
distribution, spousal support, and custody laws typically call for a subjective 
assessment of multiple factors as applied to a particular couple.82 Federal 
“marriage” law, by contrast, generally regulates the relationship of the government 
or private entities to the marital unit. Moreover, as discussed above (albeit 
critiqued below), federal law generally uses marriage as an all-or-nothing proxy for 
commitment and interdependence, rather than requiring a specific inquiry into the 
nature of the relationship between the members of the couple.83 Thus, the kind of 
detailed fact-finding—and contentiousness—that typifies state divorce proceedings 
would be far less necessary in the context of dissolving a relationship that simply 
affects federal marriage rights.84 Nonetheless, it certainly would be important to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 80. Existing proposals for federal registries, see supra text accompanying notes 62 & 
64, suggest incorporating the couple’s domicile’s rules on such matters. However, 
sometimes it may be difficult to determine whether a couple has a single domicile and, if so, 
what it is. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Leaving Home? Domicile, Family, and Gender, 47 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
 81. My thanks to Courtney Joslin for flagging this issue for me. See also Courtney G. 
Joslin, Marriage, Biology, and Federal Benefits, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1467 (2013) (providing 
detailed discussion of Social Security and military benefits that flow to children through, in 
part, recognition of marital relationships). 
 82. But several states have simplified divorce procedures that are available to couples 
with limited assets and no children. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 2400 (West 2004); MINN. 
STAT. 518.195 (2012). 
 83. There are some federal policies that require a showing of marriage “plus” other 
factors to further confirm that the marriage is legitimate. See Abrams, supra note 17, at 15–
22. 
 84. Although in most instances federal “marriage” law doesn’t directly affect 
distribution of marital property, pension plans are a partial exception. A federal law, the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), requires most pension plans to provide 
survivor annuities to the spouse of an employee in the plan, unless the spouse and the 
employee both sign a waiver. See 26 U.S.C. § 417 (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (2006). This 
rule would presumably apply to same-sex relationships in the federal registry. A separate 
provision of ERISA permits state courts to award part or all of an employee’s retirement 
plan to a spouse or former spouse, which generally occurs as part of the division of marital 
property in a divorce. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii) (2006). The standard rule is that 
such orders must be made by a state court under state domestic relations law, see id., which 
would likely be unavailable to same-sex couples living in non-recognition states (unless their 
divorce is being handled by a different state, see supra note 58). This suggests two possible 
resolutions. The first would be to amend ERISA to state that a federal forum with authority 
to dissolve the federal relationship would also be empowered to divide or assign pension 
benefits (but not other property, which would remain a matter of state law). The second 
would be to simply accept that division of such pension plans remains exclusively a matter 
of state divorce law and accordingly unavailable to many same-sex couples. As a practical 
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have a clear process by which this federal status could be terminated and an 
administrative or judicial forum in which any disputes could be resolved.85 
Although a full discussion of these implementation questions is outside the 
scope of this essay, the success of state and local programs suggests that it would 
not be unduly difficult to create and maintain such a registry. That said, there is no 
question that it would be somewhat more challenging to establish a new system 
than simply adopting agency-specific place-of-celebration rules, or even enacting a 
uniform place-of-celebration rule. On balance, I believe these logistical hurdles are 
preferable to the deep-rooted problems implicit in relying on place-of-celebration 
rules to “level up” federal policy. Additionally, under either approach, many same-
sex couples would be considered married for purposes of federal laws and 
unmarried for purposes of state law. For example, now that the IRS has adopted a 
place-of-celebration rule, married couples living in non-recognition states generally 
need to prepare and file two completely different tax returns: a federal return as a 
married couple, and two separate state returns as unmarried individuals. So long as 
state variation in marriage rights remains, such inconsistent statuses—the inversion 
of those that existed under DOMA—are the price of equality at the federal level. 
D. Ending State Marriage Bans 
The cleanest way to “level up” federal marriage policy for same-sex couples 
would be to permit same-sex couples, wherever they live, to marry under state law. 
In the months since Windsor was decided, many states have legalized same-sex 
marriage; additional litigation and legislative efforts are underway to further 
expand the number of states with marriage equality.86 And, although in 
Hollingsworth v. Perry,87 the Supreme Court declined to reach the plaintiffs’ 
substantive claim that bans on marriage by same-sex couples violate the Federal 
Constitution, sooner or later, the Supreme Court will return to the question. It is 
widely believed that in that future case, the Court will hold that such laws are 
unconstitutional. This would not only address the current inequities in state law—it 
would end the derivative federal discrimination as well. 
                                                                                                                 
matter, it would mean that an individual who had named a same-sex partner as a beneficiary 
for a retirement plan could simply remove the partner subsequent to the dissolution. There 
are pros and cons to each approach that would require careful consideration if such a registry 
were developed—and, indeed, require careful consideration under existing law because the 
Department of Labor has indicated that generally ERISA will employ a place-of-celebration 
rule in determining valid marriages. See supra note 47. 
 85. Since this federal status would implicate a couple’s status only under federal law 
and concern only federal rights and obligations, federal courts or agencies presumably would 
have jurisdiction to dissolve it. Cf. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992) 
(stating that the “domestic relations exception [to federal jurisdiction] encompasses only 
cases involving the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree”). 
 86. See, e.g., Gonzales, supra note 6; James Esseks, Expanding the Freedom to Marry: 
Here’s What’s Next, ACLU (July 9, 2013), http://www.aclu.org/blog/lgbt-rights/expanding-
freedom-marry-heres-whats-next (announcing the ACLU’s goal of increasing the number of 
states permitting same-sex marriage to twenty by the end of 2016). 
 87. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
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III. BROADENING OUT AND FOCUSING IN 
I would enthusiastically celebrate a Supreme Court decision that granted same-
sex couples the right to marry in any state. I believe that same-sex and different-sex 
couples should enjoy equal rights under both federal and state law. But the current 
debate over place-of-celebration rules versus domicile rules, like DOMA and the 
Windsor case that led up to it, shines a spotlight on the staggering breadth and 
variety of federal policies that reference marriage. And I admit that I am troubled 
by the fact that any solution that effectively “levels up” the rights of same-sex 
couples will almost certainly reduce the pressure for rethinking whether “marriage” 
itself should continue to serve as the exclusive or primary gateway to more than 
1000 federal rights and benefits. Already, in the wake of Windsor, the military has 
abandoned efforts to create a domestic partner registry in favor of relying solely on 
a uniform place-of-celebration rule.88 Similarly, several states that had created civil 
unions or domestic partnerships as a means of providing marital rights to same-sex 
couples abrogated this option when they began permitting same-sex couples to 
marry,89 and states that had established domestic partnerships providing a subset of 
marital rights and obligations eliminated the possibility of affirmatively choosing 
such a status when they modified the status to provide full marital rights.90 In other 
words, in many jurisdictions, such statuses came to be understood simply as 
stepping stones to same-sex marriage, rather than as options that might be preferred 
by some same-sex and different-sex couples. 
This is unfortunate because the current mismatch between “marriage” and 
“committed long-term interdependent relationships” for same-sex couples is only 
the tip of a much larger iceberg. The growth in marriage rights for same-sex 
couples comes at a time when family structures more generally are changing 
significantly. In 1960, 72% of the adult population was married; in 2008, barely 
half of the adult population was married, with rates falling particularly sharply for 
the poor and African Americans.91 Unmarried couples with and without children 
live together, as an alternative to marriage, a precursor to marriage, or in the 
aftermath of divorce.92 And 40.8% of all children born in the United States are born 
                                                                                                                 
 
 88. See supra note 63. 
 89. Feinberg, supra note 76, at 25. 
 90. Id. at 27. As Melissa Murray observes, there was a significant spike in domestic 
partner dissolutions immediately prior to the effective date of California’s expansion of the 
status to full marriage rights, suggesting that some couples preferred the more limited option 
and did not want to commit to full marriage rights and obligations. Melissa Murray, 
Paradigms Lost: How Domestic Partnership Went from Innovation to Injury, 37 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 291, 302–03 (2013). 
 91. PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 56, at i, 22–23, 28–29. 
 92. See, e.g., CASEY E. COPEN, KIMBERLY DANIELS & WILLIAM D. MOSHER, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH STATISTICS REPORTS NO. 64, FIRST 
PREMARITAL COHABITATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 2006–2010 (2013) (finding nearly 
one-half of women cohabit prior to marriage); PAULA Y. GOODWIN, WILLIAM D. MOSHER & 
ANJANI CHANDRA, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS 
SER. 23 NO. 28, MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A STATISTICAL 
PORTRAIT BASED ON CYCLE 6 (2002) OF THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH 11 
(2010) (collecting data showing various sequences of cohabitation and marriage). 
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to unmarried parents.93 Furthermore, the easy availability of no-fault divorce and 
the growth of prenuptial agreements means that couples who do marry may not, in 
fact, have formed the kind of long-term committed relationship with integrated 
finances that federal law assumes. 
As others have observed, the use of marriage as an all-or-nothing gateway for 
federal (and state) benefits, rights, and obligations designed to support and protect 
families is increasingly out-of-step with reality.94 Developing a federal domestic 
partner registry could offer the opportunity for rethinking the justifications for 
premising various federal rights and obligations solely on marital status for both 
same-sex and different-sex couples. That is, if same-sex couples were permitted to 
marry in all states, a domestic partner registry could play a valuable role not as a 
marriage substitute, but instead as a marriage alternative.95 There are many ways 
such a registry (or registries) could be structured. The key would be to identify the 
underlying purpose of the federal policy at issue and then tailor the requirements 
for inclusion in the registry appropriately. 
In some instances, it might be appropriate to broaden-out marital benefits. For 
example, the Family and Medical Leave Act permits eligible employees to take up 
to twelve weeks off work to care for a family member with a serious health 
condition, but limits eligible “family members” to the employee’s spouse, son, 
daughter, or parent.96 This probably works well for many employees. But some 
employees might wish to provide care for—or need to receive care from—a 
romantic partner other than a spouse, a sibling, or a close friend. Perhaps, rather 
than limiting such benefits to a “spouse,” it would be fairer and better policy to 
simply permit all employees to designate one adult individual (beyond parents or 
children) for whom she would provide care in the event of a serious health 
condition.97 
                                                                                                                 
 
 93. JOYCE A. MARTIN, BRADY E. HAMILTON, STEPHANIE J. VENTURA, MICHELLE J.K. 
OSTERMAN, ELIZABETH C. WILSON & T.J. MATHEWS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORT VOL. 61 NO. 1, BIRTHS: FINAL DATA FOR 2010 
(2012). 
 94. For proposals to retool at least aspects of federal marriage benefits to better match 
the variety of family forms and other close relationships, see generally, e.g., MARTHA 
ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH 
CENTURY TRAGEDIES 226–36 (1995); POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE, 
supra note 75, 123–214; Abrams, supra note 17, at 54–67; Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends 
with Benefits, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 220–33 (2008); Robin West, The Incoherence of 
Marital Benefits, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 179 (2012), http://www.pennlawreview
.com/online/161-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-179.pdf. 
 95. See supra text accompanying notes 76–78 (discussing jurisdictions that have 
adopted marriage alternatives). For similar arguments endorsing a “menu” of options for 
families, see, e.g., POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE, supra note 75, at 
132–45; Eskridge, supra note 76, at 1979–87; Feinberg, supra note 76, at 37–61; Murray, 
supra note 90, at 303–05. 
 96. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (2006). 
 97. In this context, there would be no reason why this would have to be a reciprocal 
obligation. For an insightful discussion of the arguments for and viability of recognizing 
“friendship” within family law more generally, see Rosenbury, supra note 94. 
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For other federal policies it might be appropriate to focus-in. Social Security 
permits a dependent spouse to claim spousal benefits, equal to 50% of the primary 
breadwinner’s benefits; divorcees may likewise claim these benefits if the marriage 
lasted at least ten years. These spousal benefits are not funded by any additional 
contribution by the wage earner into the system; they are, as Peter Martin 
characterizes it, “quite simply additional payments based on marriage,” subsidized 
by the Social Security tax-paying base generally.98 Spousal benefits have the 
greatest value to a spouse whose own earnings are considerably lower than her 
spouse’s, and, although the program is now gender neutral, the vast majority of 
recipients are women.99 As discussed above, a typical married couple with a sole 
breadwinner will receive more than $500,000 in spousal benefits.100 
There are various justifications for spousal benefits, including the presumptive 
greater needs of married couples, relative to unmarried individuals, after retirement 
of a primary wage earner; the role that domestic work by a nonbreadwinning 
spouse may have played in the primary breadwinner’s earnings; or a desire to 
support spouses who forego paid work to raise children.101 But spousal benefits are 
available even if the spouse has ample other sources of support; to couples that 
marry long after the breadwinner earned the bulk of his income; and to couples that 
never had children.102 On the other hand, they are not available to single parents 
who may likewise forego or reduce market work to care for children or to an 
individual who divorces a breadwinning spouse at any point before ten years. 
Rather than using marriage as a categorical on-off switch for benefits, Social 
Security could be redesigned to replace marriage with more tailored measures that 
respond to the core needs spousal benefits are intended to address.103 
In this respect, it is helpful to return to the question posed by Justice Alito 
during oral argument in Windsor that introduced this essay. The spirit of his 
question was correct—that is, similarly-situated couples are now treated very 
differently under federal law—but the specific factual predicate was flawed. The 
injured soldier’s partner would almost certainly be allowed to visit the hospital 
regardless of whether the couple was married, in a domestic partnership, or 
unmarried. Historically, hospitals often barred visitors who were not related to a 
patient by blood or marriage, and this was a significant problem for gay and lesbian 
                                                                                                                 
 
 98. See Martin, supra note 21, at 1; see also Goodwin Liu, Social Security and the 
Treatment of Marriage: Spousal Benefits, Earnings Sharing, and the Challenge of Reform, 
1999 WIS. L. REV. 1 (discussing the history and rationales of spousal benefits and proposing 
reforms). 
 99. See Martin, supra note 21, at 2. 
 100. See supra text accompanying note 24. 
 101. See id. at 4–7. 
 102. See, e.g., id.; Liu, supra note 98 (both making similar critiques). 
 103. In a rather ironic twist, several states that created domestic partnerships or civil 
unions that were generally available only to same-sex couples also made them available to 
different-sex couples over age 62. See Feinberg, supra note 76, at 15–16. This approach, 
designed so that couples can access state-level benefits of marriage without ending eligibility 
for federal Social Security spousal benefits stemming from a former spouse, is an implicit 
recognition that many state-level marriage rights serve different purposes than federal Social 
Security spousal benefits. 
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couples. But since 2011, a federal rule has required virtually all hospitals to permit 
patients to choose the individuals—including a spouse, domestic partner, family 
members, and friends—who will receive visitation rights.104 
Federal policymakers would do well to undergo this exercise more generally. 
For some federal policies it likely makes sense to continue to require a showing of 
marriage or comparable commitment. For others, marriage or comparable status 
might be a good default rule, but made subject to modification. And for others, it 
might be reasonable to permit, as hospitals now do, individuals to simply designate 
family or friends whom they would like to receive a given benefit. A more tailored 
approach would allow the federal government to better and more fairly meet the 
needs of real individuals—gay and straight, married and unmarried—rather than 
those of an idealized and imaginary “typical” American family. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 
 104. See 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(h)(1)–(4) (2012); Brian Bond, New Rules Require Equal 
Visitation Rights for All Patients, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www
.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/11/17/new-rules-require-equal-visitation-rights-all-patients. 
There is a comparable policy specifically for the military. See Memorandum from Chuck 
Hagel, Sec’y of Def., to Sec’ys of the Military Dep’ts (Feb. 11, 2013), available at  
http://www.defense.gov/news/Same-SexBenefitsMemo.pdf. 
